The World Bank and the Poor by Laar, A.J.M. van de
The World 8ank . 
and The Poor 
A. J. M. van de laar 

T Bank 
- and The 
A. J. M. van de laar 
No. 70, May 1979 
*This paper 'was first presented to the 
Sympos~um on World Bank Experience in 
Rural Development, held in Amsterdam, 
on May 1-2, 1979 
THE WORLD BANK AND THE POOR * 
Aart van de. Laar 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to many other symposia that have beenspon-
Elored by the Bank si.nce· its research programme became 
more firmly established nearly a decade ago, the current 
seminar attempts to assess the Bank's ownlendingprac-
tices. In the past, the Bank has too often and too long 
maintained an external .posture as if it. knew what i.t was 
doing and where it was going. The Bank's word had to be 
taken for granted, as little opportunity for review of 
what it was doing existed. With much of the .. Bank's rel-
evant outputs classified as 'restricted, confidential or 
secret'., informed discussion on its detailed activities 
has beenalmos timpos sible . Moreover', serious evaluative 
literature on the Bank is remarkably limited. ,.This sem-
inar provides a.rare opportunity to learn about the 
Bank's own learning process.in response, to the changing 
needs of the 1970s. The Bank is to be congratulated on 
opening-up its kitchen in this way, and we can but hope 
that the experience will not cause it to conclude that 
·such initiatives are to be avoided in. future. 
Since the Pearson Commission 'grand. assize' Report 
recommended basically that 'development agencies do. more 
of the same', a number of new, competing arid sometimes 
contradictory development strategies have been proposed 
that may be labelled, in shorthand. fashion, as Redistri-
bution from/with/before and without Growth. Though these 
strategies have not been elaborated in the necessaryde,-
tail to permit adequate assessment, most seem .to have in 
common that more .. explici t attention should be focused on 
the poor and .. that special efforts should be oriented to-
wards improving their earning capacity. The proposed 
strategies appear to be addressed to the world at large, 
but their implications for the activities of development 
agencies have been insufficiently explored. The World 
Bank has 13volved as the major sirigle agency to mediate 
in the. transfer of financial resources between rich and 
poor countries; it is therefore appropriate· to explore 
these implications for the Bank in some detail. The re-
marks and comments that follow have been grouped under< 
three headings: resourcere-allocation by. countries; re,.. 
source re-allocation to target groups; and implications 
of the 'professed new orientation of Bank lending for the 
internal organisation of the World Bank. That this pa-
per takes a 'deyil's advocate' position is due to some 
extent to the structur.e of this seminar, where Bank pa-
pers are ·ih ·the. majo:r:'i ty and a paper· from a Third World· 
perspective, i.e. the borrowers, is regrettably.absent.· 
2.RE-ALLOCATION TO POOR COUNTRIES? 
In announcing his plans. for the Bank during his second 
---------- ----term -of-off±ce,---Pres±dent-McNamara --stresse-d -cnnft'al-l---ex;;;;----------
pansion. Contrary to the-plansahnounced in 1968, how-
ever, no new specific regional targets were mentioned in 
the 1973 Nairobi speech. From this one might infer that 
the country allocation of Bank Group lending, as evolved_ 
-in the period 1969-73, was satisfactory or at -least not 
contrary to the new focus on problems of absolute pover-
ty. Similarly, in the Bank sponsored publication Redis-
tribution with Growth (1974) strident calls are made for 
national. redistribution, but there is relative silence 
on issues of international redistribution. 
Both the World Bank2 and the IL03 have calculated 
the nuInbers of people who subsist below-arbitrarily fixed 
poverty lines, They_find most of the absolute_poor in 
South and Southeast_ Asia and in Subsahara Africa. The 4 
Bank's -introduction of the concept of re lative poverty. 
comprising those who receive less than one third of the 
national average per capita income, appears to have been 
motivated by the desire to include Latin America as a 
region for continued Bank lending. To mix the absolute 
and -the relative poor irithis way, however, has the un-
desirable effect that people at income levels under $50 
are lumpea together with people with much higher incomes 
in other parts of the world: up to $540 in Argentina, 
$335 in_Yugoslavia,_ $295 in_ Mexico, $290 in Iran and $25.0 
in Brazil, on the basis of 1973 national average incomes 
(1975 riorld Bank Atlas) .. 
Use of. the size distribution ,of incomes and poverty 
lines. yields results. not widely different as regards.the 
.statistical location of the poor to. the rank order_ ob~ 
tained by using GNP per capita, population weighted, as 
the usual proxy: variable for more broadly defined devel-
opmentlevel indicators. We shall use GNP per capita in 
the remainder of this paper .• 
To underpin a major new long-term thrust in thedir-
ection of future Bank Group lending it would seem neces-
sary that it should be focused, at any given level of 
lending "overall', towards a narrower range of countries. 
Basically, a nuInber. of. other countries need .. to be declared 
'developed' ,thus allowing .the Bank to gradually phase 
out its lending to them and to concentrate its efforts in 
the form of resources,-money and staff, on_the remainder. 
It may be argued that, to avoid having to make hard 
choices of priori ties between-. countries, continued lend,,-
ingto higher income countries can be justified if it 'is 
directed to, their poorer regions,'or to the poorer strata 
of their populations.- . 
Stru'ctural bottlenecks and regional disparities can, 
of_ course, always be cited to continue past' c;:ountry patterns 
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of lending. Nobody would deny that some 'past borrow-
ers' continue to face serious balance of payments dif-
ficulties and structural and regional problems. Yet 
Bank lending to them has been phased-out, and the Bank 
now has to make a similar decision for a group of other 
countries. 
At issue is where to draw the line for inter-
country priorities. Are regional income disparities in 
higher ~ncome countries judged to be more intractable 
than national development problems in countries with 
lower average incomes which may also face severe region-
al and sectoral problems? Countries with higher aver-
age incomes have attained a broader resource base which 
may enable them to pursue redistributive policies .than 
have countries with lower average incomes and much less 
to redistribute. To the extent that Bank Group assis-
tance is usually marginal, when measured against total 
national investment, this marginal contribution' can prob-
ably be better used to help increase the national cake 
in poorer countries than to back up redistributive pol-
icies in richer countries. 
Countries where pockets .of the population live in 
absorute or relative poverty, say the Northeast of Bra..., 
zil or the southern states of Yugoslavia, often display 
strong political, social and cultural cleavages that may 
exclude minority groups from the political process that 
decides on resource allocations. The notion that inter-
national donors should step in in cases where the nation-
al body politic is either. unable or unwilling to do much 
for its own poor, assumes that international solidarity 
should be greater than national solidarity. This is 
likely to run into very serious political opposition in . 
at least some donor countries. 5 The experience which 
such minority groups have had in continuous confronta-
tion with the prevailing power structure may have led 
them to subsequently withdraw to regions and activities 
where that confrontation could be evaded. Under such 
conditions it is diff·icult to imagine that .external off-
icial assistance, which has to operate through national 
government and prevailing power structures, could be an 
effective lever with which to improye the terms of incor-
porating such minority groups within the wider national 
society. 
Moreover, during the 1970s a considerable number of 
higher income countries obtained access to alternative 
sources of external finance on an unprecedented scale. 
Thus, the leverage which .may be associated with Bank lend-
ing, ~e terms of which were considerably hardened in 
1976,will be much re.duced in such countries as compared 
to the leverage in lower income countries which do not 
have access to alternative sources of external funds to . 
the same degree. A reduced 'future role of the Bq.nk in 
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the higher income countries fits its charter purpose as 
a lender ~ of~ last resort . 
It seems,therefore,that on balance are-allocation 
-'----of-:tending--brcountry:-is--preferable-'and'1l1ore-promis'ing--'--" 
thana re-allocation ,to poorer regions within a relative-
ly more developed country. This is not to say ,that the 
Bank'sstudiesa:nd policy advices to the higher income 
countries should ,also cease. It may still be worthwhile 
to study whether, for instance, the nature of adopted 
new technologies might diminish the chances that lagging 
population groups "will ever be able to catch up in a mod-
ernisation process that benefits them. But the 'carrot, 
and stick' approach, combining policy advice and lending, 
will then no longer be possible. 
A second argument for avoiding 'the issue of esta:b-
lishingpriori ties between" countries is that poorer coun-
tries may not have enough bankable projects to permit a 
rapid expansion of Bank lending. In.the past, the ,dearth 
ofwell~prepared projects has been said to ,have ,been the 
main constraint on the, volume of Bank lending. 7 Over 
time, the absorptive capacity to prepare projects has 
undoubtedly increased in most countries, and there, is no 
obvious ,reason why a 'shift in lending to lower income 
couhtries, would not necessarily ,mean that quantitative 
lending targets could not be met, though it may hamper 
the Bank's search for small and difficult projects which 
might be of direct benefit to the poor. Lending could 
continue for traditional projects and sectors in'which 
the Bank has acquired a comparati veadvantage, ,because 
such ,projects would still be required in the future. But 
it would,then have ,to be, proved ,that the country in ques-
tionl).ad,shifted its national policies 'in such a way as 
to increase "the chances for improvement of laggingpopu-, 
lation, groups. In the absence of specific knowledge 
about the, nature of the growth process and of the effects 
of poliCies on different ,population groups, however, this 
is a tall order. 
A third argument. against a refocusing of Bank Group 
lending. may be the fear of problems of limitedcreditwor-
thiness of lower income countries. Risks of lack of cred-
itworthiness are not confined to poorer countries, how-
ever; some rich countries also have limited external cred-
itworthiness. Moreover, the assUmption would then be that 
Bank lending over 1969-1974 has not been risky and has 
not met constraints stemming from limited.creditworthi-
'ness of recipient countries. The·Bank made almost half 
of its new loans in 1969-74 to countries which the 1971 
Bank External Debt Study had judgedvulnera:b.le in this 
respect. 
, A';final argument against a'major re-allo'cation of 
resources' towards the poorer nations is toassert ... that 
the very poor' are ,beyond being helped, that assisting 
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them will merely prolong their misery without providing 
any hope that conditions maybe improved in the long 
run. Such harsh imolied condemnation of the 'Fourth 
World' may. be softened somewhat by blaming 'unjust' rul-
ing structures for the misery, and is sometimes ration-
alised by saying that any support for those structures 
will only perpetuate human misery. On the contrary, so 
runs the argument, external aid should remain focused on 
those who have a real likelihood of developing under 
their own power in due course. Aid should not be dissi-
pated to those beyond relief, particularly since avail-
able aid is insufficient to help everyone. 
There are several factors to consider. Awithdraw-
al of aid may indeed hasten the downfall of an 'unjust' 
regime. There is, however, no guarantee whatsoever that 
it would be succeeded,by one which would prove less 'un-
just' and oppressive than its predecessor. Confronted 
with the same stubborn problems of hunger and poverty, 
new regimes· are likely to forget their campaign promises 
once they are in power; or, in the many:i:nstanceswhere 
changes in government merely reflect intra-'elite exchan-
ges, election promises for broad-based reforms are not 
even made ex-ante, let alone implemented ex-post. 
Neglect by aid donors of the Fourth World does not 
mean that the Fourth World will cease to exist, and an 
argument to the effect that the rich cannot afford more 
aid is not tenable when we consider the resources which 
they waste on useless armaments. Total world military 
expenditure in 1976, for instance, was more than the GNP 
of Africa and South America combined. 8 
2.1 IBRD: the 'loserj' 
What, then, are the possibilities for making room ~n fu-
ture IBRDlending capacity to do relatively more for the 
poorer countries? Several options may be pursued seria-
t~. .. 
Advance repayments of debts of 'past borrowers' 
would provide the Bank with an extra margin of lending 
capacity of about $1 billion. Such advance repayments 
can only berE3quested, however , and objections may be 
made when pressure is exerted because 'contracts are con-
tracts'. About 40% of the $1 billion outstanding from 
Part I. countries is due from Japan. . 
An 'easy' way for the Bank to narrow its list of fu-
ture clients is to harmonise the various definitions of 
LDCs which are in current use. The Bank, prior to its 
new .orientation to the poor, still lent to a number of 
member countries which, according to the UN classifica-
tion,should not be·on the .list·ofdeveloping countries. 
This lending is summarised in Table ·1. 
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Lending to this group is now negligible to all coun-
tries but Greece. A further reduction would not give 
the Bank much scope for a major reori.entation to poorer 
countries. Lending to. Greece may perhaps cease if and 
when- Greece .. _joins_.the .. European. Economi.c. Community_ (EECL 
A future major concentration of effort and funds 
on the poorer countries would seem to call for drastic 
curtailment of_ the number of countries eligible for fu-
ture Bank lending. Let us consider the implications of 
lowering the upper limit for Bank lending to twice the 
upper eligibility limit for··IDA lending, or above $1000 
GNP per capita in 1975 dollars. To take a broader range, 
say, up to three times the IDA limit, or about. $1600, 
would.not yield enough in terms of lending volume or num-
bers of countries for which one might consider a possible 
stabilisation and longer-term phasing-out of Bank lend-
ing. .This gives rise to the countries listed in Table 2. 
_ Lending to the seven countries whose per capita in-
comes are over $1600 has declined from 8.3% of total in 
1969-74 to 0.6% in 1975-78, a very sizable reduction which 
may be sustained in future; i.-e. these countries may be 
able to fend for themselves in future. The decrease in 
lending is largely due to Iran which no longer borrows 
from the Bank. 
There are 13 countries whose per capita GNP was bet-
ween $1000 and. $1570 in 1975. 
Lending to Argentina is clearly the most controver-
sial since heavy .Bank lending will tend .to legitimise the 
military regime. Whilst the latter took measures to res-
tore the external creditworthiness of the country, few 
would rate the regime as being deeply concerned with im-
proving the lot of the poor. On country grounds it would 
thus be difficult to .justify this lending. On project 
grounds, however, some projects would seem to be defens-
ible.- It is noted that the US abstained.twice in 1977 
(IBRD, and IFC) and voted against three loans to Argen-
tina proposed by the IADB, on human rights considerations, 
thereby stressing .its view that the mere restoration of 
creditworthiness was insufficient justification for a re-
sumption of lending by international financial- iristitu-
tions. 9 
Lending to Portugal is almost the contrary. An un-
popular military dictatorship was overthrown arid Bank 
lending may be ,seen as assisting the country to develop 
along more democratic lines. Portugal may also ask ass-
istance from the EEC. 
Lending to Mexico has barely kept up with inflation. 
The futUre. availability of oil revenues for Mexico makes 
it likely that Bank lending to that country could be grad-
ually reduced, in relative terms. But Mexico's GNP per -
capita is at the lower end of the scale, as is Brazil's. 
Lending to Yugoslavia and Romania has clear politic-
al significance in that both countries are trying to 
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reorient themselves away from Soviet Russia. For this 
reason it seems unlikely that the Bank will pressurise 
these ... countriesto reduce their borrowings from the Bank. 
Lending to .Romanial a Bank member only since 1973, ,has 
developed remarkably fast. The scope for 'savingsl in 
this group to be divertE:!d to poorer countries is thus 
likely to remain limited. 
While lending to these countries may continue at 
high.absolute,levels, it is .obvious that the Bank's lev-
eragE:! to persuade them to pursue policy ,goals of better 
income distribution has been,diminished. It may be ques-
tioned whether the. Bank had. much leverage;in the past, in 
view Of .the size and. sophistication of these countries. in 
setting their own priorities, but it has. in . any case been 
reduced due to the fact that Brazil,Mexico, Yugoslavia 
and'Argentina have been among the largest borrowers in 
the Eurodollar market .10 . 
If pressure;increases on the Bank to phase-out lend-
ing to the higher income countries in order to do rela-
tively more for those.with lower average per capita in~ 
comes, this will accelerate its withdrawal from large 
par.tsof Latin America. The.Bank, on its own saying, will 
need considerable time to develop projects and policies 
that will benefit .the .poorer strata of society, and it 
may well be that, say by .the mid to late-1980s, such ex-
pertise .will no longer bethought.relevant as many Latin 
American countries will by then have bec.ome independent 
of Bank tutelage. Although the need for a poverty orien-
tation may c::ontinue in large parts of Latin America, the 
Bank will then no longer bein a position to assist im-
plementationthrough direct lending activities. 
One argument sometimes used for prudence in 'declar-
ing' countries 'developed' rather. than 'developing' is 
that past borrowers may evolve into contributors to IDA. 
This argument may not have much appeal for IJ'atin America 
where several countries are not even members of IDA and 
the volume of .IDA credits is very limited, given IDA. el-
igibility criteria. Cultural and social affinity may .be 
important forces in instigating aid programmes , and one 
would have to believe that Latin American contributors 
would be willing to contribute through IDA to countries 
in Africa. and Asia. It is likely that preference will be 
given to. bilateral programmes and to the IADB's Fund for 
Special Operations in a regional context rather than to 
IDA, US domination of which is resented even more by Lat-
in American countries than the VS role in the IADB; Ven-
ezuela has not contributed, for instance, to the Fifth 
IDA replenishment. 
2.2 IBRD; 'WinneI's': the pooI'est? 
Let us. first look at IBRD lending to the group of 'poor-
est countries', as in the classification used by 'the 
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Bank. 11 It must be kept in mind . that poor countries may 
receive considerable CUlIounts'of IDA credits in addition 
to (limited) arnount.s of·Bank loans. Two countries have, 
.... b-een -a'dded,Tndonesia-and'Niger ia 7 'which;' "t.h6i.igh-at''''pre-s·;;;-''' 
ent with somewhat higher average per capita incomes, are 
in a special category because they are major oil expor-
ters (Table 3) • .' . 
Of the Least Dev'eloped Countries (LDCs) ,17receive 
'no IBRD loans at alIi of the rernainderTarizania is the 
largest current ,recipient. Altogether ,this groupre-' 
ooived2.8%of IBRD loans in 1969";74 against. orily 1.4% in 
1975-78. The latter figure is even exaggerated because 
it includes some Third Window loans; when those are sub-
tract.ed,the perceritage of straight Bank loans in 1975-
78 is reduced to 0.9%. 
Prospects for IBRD lending in this group are bleak. 
IBRDlending to the 'other poorest' rose from 6.1% of to-
tal commitments in 1969-74 to 8.2% in 1975-78. If we ex-
clude loans from the Third Window, commitments were only 
7% of total new loans; 
In sum, IBRD lending to 33 countries, with a com-
bined population in 1975 of 1 billion people, and ~ll be-
longing to the group of countries with the lowest average 
per capita incomes, increased from 8.9% of total new lend-
ing in 1969-74 to 9.6% in 1975";78. But the share declined 
to 7.9% if we exclude loans on Third Window terms. A siz-
able share of IBRD lending to these countries is directly 
linked to projects of an enclave type character. Lending 
for such purposes tends to accentuate dualism in the dev--
elopment,of the couritries .. There were projects in support 
of bauxite in Guinea ($65 million), copper and nickel in 
Botswana ($32 million); copper and cobalt in Zaire ($100 
million), andpetroleurn and natural gas in-India ($150 
milllon) • 
Lending to Indonesia and Nigeria has been stepped 
up from 3.7% of ,total in 1969-74 to 9.7% in '1975-78. Both 
are major petroleum exportersitheythus ,have much im-
proved creditworthiness prospects for other foreign fi-
nanciers, which redlices Bank influence. 
2;3 IBRD~" Gaine.':t's ' : the not-sa-poor' 
IBRD lending to countries with per capita GNP in 1975 bet-
ween $250 and $520 is detailed in Table 4. 
Together, this group received 10.9% of new Batik loans 
in 1969-74 and 17.4% in 1975-78, or 16.3% excluding loans 
on Third Window terms. 
The whole relative increase was due to three coun-
tries: Egypt, the Philippines and Bolivia. Egypt, which 
had not received a Bank loan since 1959, received no less 
than $675 million in 1975-78, a"veryremarkable Ch.3:nge in 
the Bank's creditworthiness judgement of, the countrY. 
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Lending to the Philippines accelerated sharply from an 
annual level of $48 million in 1969-74 to $301 million 
in 1975-78" despite serious balance of payments deficits 
and terms of trade losses. Lending to Bolivia has in-
creased considerably from a single 'loan in 1969 .'fora 
gas ];>ipelineto no less than 12 ope;rationsin 1975-78. 
Have country policies changed much to the benefit of the 
poor 'in recent years? 
2.4 The future aHocation of IBRD resources 
The Bank states that its current regional distribution of 
lending is~not the direct result: of any overall ,regional 
policy considerations, but .ratheremerges from the pro-
grammes of lending to individual countries. The. question 
is whether this adding up of individilalprogrammes leads 
to acceptable results overall. The more so because IBRD 
accounts for about 70% of Bank Group financial resources 
available for developing countries. 
The rapid,expansionof Bank lending in the early 
1970s has been absorbed by very few countries: Brazil, 
Iran, Turkey and Korea-increased t.heir share from 10.4% 
in 1963-68 to 27.3% in 1969-74; while that of India, Pak-
istanandBangladesh decreased from 9.8 to 4.2 percent. 
Since the. Bank became concerned with the poor there 
has been no major change in lending, towards the poorer 
countries. As was n'oted in an evaluation of the World 
Bank and the Inter American Development Bank, the 'World 
Bank was not successful in increasing its share of total 
lending to the. poorest cquntries' .12 This conclusion is 
largely confirmed by our analysis. Now that the Board 
takes much more direct interest in the scope of Bank ac-
tivities, it seems logical that in future it should not 
only review the overall volume of IBRD lending but also 
the distribution by country and income levels. Strenuous 
efforts should then be made to redirect IBRD lending to-
wards the poorer countries. IDA credits to this group of 
countries'are diminishing, and they may well have to rely 
heavily on IBRD and other public foreign financing until 
such time as their economic structure has been sufficient-
ly diversified and strengthened to attract external funds 
from a broader spectrum of financiers. Inasfar as limited 
creditworthiness is raised as an issue, Bank lending in 
the early 1970s has also been risky. Questions of limi-
ted absorptive capacity can be resolved given some time. 
2.5 Re-aZZocation of IDA resources 
Geographical distribution of IDA resources and.allocation 
by income levels has' received much more attention in the 
past than specific allocation problems ofIBRD.resources. 
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Table 5 shows that, dUJ:'ingthe last 'few years ,in 
particular, a cOnsiderable shift in lending has,occur:r:ed 
. ",_towards_._thELl.gg!?.t:~_deJ(eloP,e.g.s;.o:wJ,t;t;':!"es. _,J'lo.th''gJ;'o.upS....!IDar.:::. ____ '' __ _ 
giIlIi1,' and 'other poorest' ha,ve had,to give way. In 
1975-7!3,.lend;lng, to"the ,grOup of 'marginal' ,countries was 
confined 'to four onli~ Thetr,end towaJ;'ds lending.to the 
poorer countrie~ was firmly established, inthe late 1960s 
however, and thus predated the new orientation of Bank 
Group lemdin9. 
Lending to cOl,mtries whose per capita incomes were 
between $266-520 in 1975-78 amounted to only 11.3% of the 
total, and went. to 18 countries., Further, reduction of ' 
lending, to this group by lowering ,the upper eligibility 
limit, for IDA is thus likely. to meet resistance in the 
Board 'and would notiree any considerable funds forre-
distributi6n to poorer countries.' . . 
If the allocation of IDA were to be redirected ac-
cording to weight of population, we shou:J,d ,obtain the 
following. Among countries with more than 20 million in-
habitants,Eth:i,opia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Burma, India and 
Pakistan account,edi:n mid:-1975 for 77% of the population 
of all countries. which received IDA credits under the 
Fourth Replenishment period. They received 61.4% of, total 
IDA commitments in 1975-78. From this perspective it 
could' 'be argued that further concentration on those coun-
tries ,would be ;justified even, if one discounted somewhat 
for the relatively higher per capita income of Egypt. 
Thus a little 'improvement' i:n the allocation pattern 
could,. be ,achieved. Current attempts by the Board to re:-
duce the IDA share for India should be resisted. 
If,poorcoulltries are to be hl:llped materially, the 
overall bilateral allocation, of Official 'Development 
Assistance, (ODA) should be exal'!1ined, since it appearE! to 
be much. less focused on the poorcoulltries than the cur:-
rent' IDA allo.c,ation. If DAC countries would be willing 
to :focus their ODA on, the poor countries, a substantially 
increased flow of resources could thus be made available. 
, Wi thin the fram~work of a, basic needs strategy,. 
Streeten andUl Haql 'of the World Bank have ,argued for 
a $2 billion annual increase (at constant prices) over 
the 1980~2000 period to be allocated 80% to the poorest 
c6untries, and 20%,to those in the middle income countries, 
a dramatic reversal of" the current 40: 60 ratio. 
The use'of an average per capita income limit, as is 
done by the Bank for IDA allocations, effectively discrim-
inates against most of Latin America and countries in 
North Afri9a and the Middle East. Many countries would 
strenuously object to even more widespread and effective 
use,ofthis yardstick for the future allocation. of, ODA. 
Many would like to maintain privileges and benefits ,un-
der prevailing ',special, relationships' ~ Others would 
want to'apply poor-oriented prOject criteria and the 
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reZativepoverty concept in order that they might contin-
ue to receive,ODA. The decision taken by 12 European 
countries in 1976 to join the Inter-American Development 
Bank, whereby they are also expected to contribute to its 
Fund for Special Operations, is regrettable from the per-
spective of redistributing scarce ODA to the poorest coun~ 
tries. 
3. REACHING TARGET GROUPS 
If re-allocation by countries proves politically diffi~ 
cult for an institution with as wide a membership and 
clientele as the World Bank, its reorientation to the 
poor should be seen mainly in the effectiveness with 
which it can reach target groups. The Bank has chosen 
as its main target group the small farmer. His produc-
tivity is to be increased through the introduction of 
improved technological packages and through better access 
to land, water, credit and extension facilities. 14 Some 
indications of this shift in Bank lending are given in 
Table 6. 
Other evidence corroborates the changing emphasis 
in Bank lending in aZZ sectors towards the poor. On the 
basis of appraisal reports for 1972 and 1977, Weaver et 
aZ attempted to determine the intended beneficiaries of 
projects in all sectors of the ,World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank. They find that the increase 
in poor-orientedIADB loans has been less than that in ' 
the World Bank, but this can be partially explained by 
the fact that in 1972 a much higher portion of IADB pro-
jects were already directed ,toward the poor. IS The irony 
is that the rationale for setting up the IADB in 19S9 was 
that it could lend in the 'innovative' social sectors 
which the World Barikthen considered beyond its scope. 
Thu~, the Bank is now catching up rather than leading the 
way! 
The shift in Bank lending has not been without its 
costs. Disbursements in certain major sectors, particu-
larlyagriculture, will for several years be somewhat 
lower than would be expected on the basis of past disburse-
ment experience. 16 But previous experience shows that 
disbursements in agriculture substantially lagged behind 
other sectors. In the early 1970s five 'years after sign-
ing the loans, average disbursemerit rates were 60% for 
Agriculture, against 84% for Electric Power, 78% for 
Transportation and 80% for Industrial projects. 17 While 
these differences may be due to sector characteristics, 
they may also be related to major problems which the Bank 
encountered with 'old style' agricultural projects. 
Yudelmanhas noted that ,of the several hundred'agricul-
tural projects underway in 1973 only 23%were'judgedto 
be trouble-free when measured against appraisal report 
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agreements. At,.the o.ther endofthe.spectrum, 38% were 
deemed to be plagued by. major problems. 1B, In contrast, 
Balllllme.~tI~IlEi, ClJ3anls-::-wide sha.rEl··Of, '2rClpleIlLprClje,c:i:~~~L_ 
only 10%... . . 
To the extent that. the Bank succeeds through co-
financing arrangements to link foreign and.domestic re-
sources to its 'new style' agricultural and rural devel-
opment projects, scarce investment funds are put in high 
risk sectors under institutional arrangements which 
shift the burden of such risks entirely onto the recip-
ient governments as donors are unwilling to write off 
loans for risky and failed projects which they themselves 
have promoted. . 
Disbursement rates and adherence to appraisal .report 
agreements are not necessarily related to the impact of 
projects. With poor~oriented sector policies ·clarified 
in 1974 and 1975, and project leadtimes of about 2~ years 
from identification to Board presentation, impact assess-
ments cannot meaningfully be undertaken until several 
years after disbursements, i.e. by the early to mid-
1980s. Whether or not donors would be prepared to give 
development agencies the benefit of the doubt for such a 
relatively long period, politically speaking, remains to 
be seen. 
Impact s'tudies of past development proj ects suppor-
ted by the Bank are. few. Assessment of the IDA-supported 
farm mechanisation programme in Pakistan in the second 
half of the 1960s estimated the ex post social rate of 
return at 24%, which would seem satisfactory for me chan-
ising farmers in the area. However,. the net destruction 
of jobs was estimated at five per tractor and 'there is 
little indication that the ,labour displaced from·agricul-
ture had any significant employment opportunities or prod-
uctivevalue elsewhere in the Pakistan. economy.' .20 The 
Bank refused further funding when·these results became 
known; bilt the country borrowed elsewhere and continued 
the project without Bank support. 21 Prior Bank support 
had helped to create vested interests which are now able 
to fend for themselves! The Muda irrigation study found 
that the 'increase in income at the .farm level, has not 
been evenly distributed across the already unequal pat-
tern of income distribution and has, therefore, served 
to worsen that distribution,.22 
. The broad sectoral classification of Bank lending 
given in the Annual Reports is not very .useful forgaug-
ing the nature, width and depth of changing emphasis in 
Bank lending towards the benefit of small .. farmers. A 
more useful classification is to .be found in the 1975 
Sector Policy Paper on Agricultural Credit, which shows 
a modest share for··'small farmer' projects. The tables 
in' that paper might use.fully be updated. 
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Relatively large numbers of small farmers are reached 
through smallholder projects for tea, oil palm or cocoa, 
Bank support for which appears to be based on production 
characteristics which require a central processing unit 
to act,as a,natural marketing monopoly through which fi-
nancial discipline can be ,more readily'established and 
enforced. As regards food crops, farmers often avail 
themselves of subsidised inputs but prefer outside pri-
vate sales if they judge the marketing agency ,to be in~ 
efficient and thus not in their inter'est. Two pOints 
are in order. In 197,3, the Executive Directors decided 
to follow a restrictive policy in new tea planting so as 
not to increase competition between ,South Asia and East 
Africa or to weaken world market ,prices. In 1974, how-
ever, this led to a mere substitution among traditional 
donor, roles in Kenya, with the ,Bank financing tea factor-
ies and the Commonwealth Development Corporation the new 
plantings. 23 , ' 
Secondly, the US Congress has ,been pushing hard for 
amendments in its Foreign Assistance legislation to re-
strict use of funds to establish :or expand the production 
of palm oil, sugar or citrus crops. In face of this press-
ure and to forestall negative reactions from the US Con-
gress, it seems that many of the more recent nucleus es-
tates andoutgrowers projects are presently justified 
primarily as 'rehabilitation projects' which involve no 
new production. 
The assessment of rural projects 'new style'must 
be confined to the nature of the design features incor-
porated in new projects. 'l'lhat is meant, for instance, 
by the statement that 'about 70% of the Bank's agricul-
tural loans might contain a component for the small 
Farmer' ?24' . 
Insofar as th'eBank' ssector policy papers specify 
a number of design criteria, Bank representatives might 
like to comment specifically ,on the following: 
(a:) Have pr.oduction packages been found that have been 
sufficiently field-tested in terms of technical, social 
and ecological constraints? While a number of crops can 
be grown under a wide range of plausible inplits, could 
it be that, say, as a result of the 1974':;;75 international 
fertiliser crisis, initial soil fertility is being ex-
hausted in a number of projects? In a review of 18 pre-
1973 rural development projects, the Bank's Operations 
Evaluation Department found that in only four out of 18 
cases were production targets achieved or surpassed. 
Severe problems or uncertainties were associat,ed with 
technical packages recommended for certain projects. 
Some of them had not been properly tested at farm level 
or did not fit local ecological orsocio-economiccon-
ditions. 25 
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As pressure increases on donor agencies to imple-
mentrural projects, there is agrave danger that more 
insufficiently' tested packages'will be introduced" with 
.~ ~·~correspond;ing·-·grave~risks-for- the~farmers~ concerned-;-~' --~ 
(b) How have, countries responded to Bank proposed cred-
it policies involving a shift towards a positive real 
interest rate, a tough policy on default, and the sub-
stitution of earning capacity for land title as a basis 
for collateral? .' Most studies on rural credit point to 
the very poor performance in reaching the small farmers. 
Has the Bank been,able to advise on improvedinstitution~ 
al arrangements, in view of Willoughby's (the first OED 
director during 1970-75) judge~entthat 'among the Bank's 
,relative weaknesses, one might mention its frequent dif-
ficulties in participating effectively at the level of 
b?rrower's institutional arrangements, training and staff-
ing issues,?20 Yudelman notes that most of the project 
problems related to management issues. No less than 47% 
of all projects underway in 1973 had some managerial prob-
lems. Thes~ te~~ to occur in the third year of project 
implementat~on. Are these problems related to the turn-
over of initial (often expatriate) project staff? 
(c) .what sort of new institutions does the Bank envis-
age should be created to assist poor farmers in view of 
the somewhat negative evaluation ~~ the effectiveness of, 
for instance'2lJral cooperatives, agricultural exten- ' 
sion services, and settlement agency staff. 3U Bunting's 
comments may ,also be relevant in questioning the specif-
iCity of the Bank's institution building activities. 
'Our experience of attempts to change agriculture during 
the ,last 25 years has shown not only that it is dangerous 
to transplant ideas about institutions, but also that ef-
fective results may be achieved in what appear to be sim-
ilar circumstances by widely ~tffering institutional and 
administrative arrangements'. 
(d) Insofar as the, Bank's 1975 Rural Development paper 
recognises that few countries conceive of rural develop-
ment efforts in'an overall coherent policy framework, to 
what extent do impact evaluations of past projects con-
firm or contradict ,the thrust of UNRISD's main conclu-
sions about the social and economic consequences of,·the 
large-scale introduction of Green Revolution-type tech-
nologies in developing countries?32 
4. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
To the extent that donors are sincere and consistent in 
requiring that their aid benefits the poor.., and not,all 
major donors agree about; its desirability ~ donor instit-
,utions should make efforts to experiment" wi th novel ap-
proaches. ' 
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As long as 'modernisation thinking' remained the 
main mode of development thinking, donor agencies saw 
themselves as mediating in the "transfer' of those at-
tributes or 'missing ingredients' which were apparently 
in short supply. in developing countries. . 
Realisation has fallen short of expectation and it 
is increasingly recognised·that development knowledge is 
not a stock with transferable properties, that the task 
o.f a development agency is not only to do but also to 
learn. Knowledge yet to be discovered cannot, by defin-
ition, be more. abundant in one part of the world than 
another. Technical assistance provided by the Bank is 
thus not necessarily superior to that of other agencies, 
as the Bank often tends to believe. When learning is an 
essential part of a task, it behoves to be modest. But 
modesty is not the main characteristic of the Bank as an 
institution,or of its staff. 
If learning is essential, the institution must be 
set up to facilitate it. Although the need for learning 
now seems to be recognised,. it has become difficult for 
the Bank to readjust its organisational structure and 
operational style. Its future performance may thus fall 
short of expectations. . 
The Bank has grown enormously over the past decade, 
and internal bureaucratisation and the need for external 
accountability have increased considerably. The 1972 re-
organisation stressed. effiaienay in handling the larger 
lending flow and aaaountabiZity for work done, and.man-
power budgeting techniques were introduced since. Out-
put is defined as total reports and studies produced and 
number and dollar value of projects prepared, and the 
Bank is not able to predict future output levels with 
great accuracy. The use of such manpower techniques un-
fortunately tends to give staff the wrong signals. While 
the need for more in-depth research and more circumspect 
project preparation is evident, it is thwarted by the in-
troduction of severe. time constraints on the production 
of output. This leads to widespread risk-avoiding behav-
iour. Research requires a venture into the unknown and 
output is unpredictable. To avoid 'overdue notice' staff 
will tend to .tread familiar paths in order to avoid any 
uncertainty which might arise if they strayed. 
The 1972 Bank reorganisation stressed the appraisal 
part of the proj'ect cycle. Much energy has been spent on 
designing procedures and on incorporating income distri-
bution weights, etc., but by the appraisal stage it is 
much too late to do anything about projects. 
. King, in rev~ewing the Bank reorganisation, rightly 
notes that it is in the early stages of the project cy~ 
cle that concern about employment-and income distribution 
can most adequately be considered: 'The emphasis of .the 
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Reorganization exerc:i:se did not contribute to the devel-
opment of procedures and methods for more effective pro-
~-- ~-j ecLgeneration __ and_design-'--.l~ ___ .-.::-.:--..... --.~-.-: ... -.--c-.,--.--.. --.. ~-.~. 
The Bank has not received sufficient well-prepared 
projects, and has thus. had to organise its project flow 
by drawing upon UJ)IDP.Reports, by financing technical 
. assistance, and by active involvement of its own· staff 
in projeCt preparation. 34 
The new emphasis is likely to increase that involve-
ment, putting a heavy burden on project officers· who must 
deal with counterparts in developing countries, and whose 
project designs must be screened within the Bank by ever 
more supervisory staff, none of whom have been present 
during discussions. with counterparts in borrowing coun-
tries. 
The further that the Bank penetrates into earlier 
stages of. the project cycle and the more it streamlines 
its internal teamwork and procedures in Washington, the 
greater the risk that dialogue with the developing coun-
try will fail. But insofar as grassroots efforts require 
local involvement and participation, a conflict may dev-
elop between the crystallisation of local initiatives, a 
time-consuming process that is also erratic, and the Bank's 
needs for clarity, speed and arrangements that suit its 
internal bureaucratic structure. ·-The most disturbing re-
sult (for donor agencies) ·of· the study by Morss et al 35 
of 36 projects aimed at small farmers in Africa and Latin 
America, is that projects that have had a large dose of 
foreign government fun.ding i'n their early years scored 
significantly lower than average of other projects in 
terms of three composite indicators pertaining to 'over-
all success ';, overall local action'., and 'prospects of 
self~sufficiendy'; 
The logic of 'new style' projects is that.they re-
quire greater care and broader participatory dialogue 
with developing countries at the early identification 
stage. In this light it is disturbing to read in the 
1978 Administrative Budget that the ratio of total lend-
ing cost to number of operations approved dealined by 13% 
between 1973 and 1977. 'The reduction in this use of 
manpower suggests that nowada'ys staff efforts, particu-
larly in the early stages of ·identification and prepar-
ation, are Detter focused on projec.tswhich are likely to 
materialize indue aourse as approved loans' (myempha-' 
sis') .36 Projects which promise smooth sailing up the 
Bank's increasing hierarchy are not likely to be the ex-
perimental, 'news-l:yle' projects which may be required, 
in that· higher levels in the hierarchy must compensate 
their lack of involvement at the level of face-to-face 
country contacts with· formal rules of precedents and 
bureaucratic routines. Though:t:he Agriculture and Rural 




less 'bureaucratic', pressure on it to 'produce'is even 
stronger, as its p~ojects are made the test of the Bank's 
'new style'. 
The apparent squeeze on the Administrative Budget 
of the Bank forces Bank staff to find alternatives to es-
cape from excesses of its own manpower planning and bud-
getary. control techniques, which are more appropriate 
for organisations which produce off-the-rack rather than 
tailor-made outputs. 
One tendency may be that insufficiently or inade-
quately prepared projects will be presented to the Board. 
Since 1968 when quantitative lending targets became im-
portant for the Bank, over 40% of all loan operations 
have been bunched in the final quarter of the fiscal year. 
'Loose ends', which otherwise would have been investiga-
ted and cleared up, may be presented as problems for proj-
ect. management to resolve after approval of the loan, 
thus increasing the possibility that major problems will 
emerge during implementation. 
A second tendency may call for placing a number of 
activities outside the purview of management and Board. 
Although the Bank's research activities have grown con-
siderably since 1969 - much of it not relevant for the 
Bank as a project lending agency - total technical assis-
tance included in IBRD loans and IDA credits has also 
increased, from 70% of total IBRD/IDA administrative ex-
penses in 1969/71 to slightly over 100% of that budget 
in 1976/77. Could it be that apparent Bank efforts to 
economise on project design are being compensated by in-
cluding more technical assistance in its loans, to be 
repaid by borrowers? One would like to see a breakdown 
of this incorporated technical assistance. 
17 
Table 1: IBW . lending to high inaome aountries 
country Per capita GNP 1969'-74 1975-78 in 1975 
Iceland 5620·* 11 
Finland 4710 75 20 
New Zealand 4680 * 24 
Israel 3469 140 35 
Spain 2750 240 51 
Ireland 2390 123 30 
Greece 2340 152 301 
TOTAL 765 437 
Annual 
average 127 109 
as % of new 
commitments 6.3 2.1 
.. 1976 rvor7..d Bank At7..as. Annex 
Source: Annual Reports 
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Table 2: IBRD lending to countries with per capita GNP over $.1600 
and ,$1000 (1975) ,respectively ($ rrrilZion) 
GNP p~c. Population' new IBRD commitmentsb 
country 
1975 ($) 1975 (mln) 1969-74 1975-78 
Bahamas 3110 0.2 10 
Gabon 2540 0.5 16 5 
Singapore 2450 2.3 84 25 
, Venezuela 2220a 12.0 136 
Oman 2100 0.8 8 17 
Trinidad and To~ago 2000 1.1 56 12 
Iran 1660 33.4 823 53 
Total 50.3 1123 122 
Annual average 187 41 
As % of new commitments 9.3 0.6 
Portugal 1570 9.6 241 
Argentina 1550 25.4 319 485 
Yugoslavia 1550 21.4 548 1073 
Urugu<;ty 1300 2.8 53 62 
Panama 1290 1.7 100 ' 106 
Iraq 1280a 11.1 120 
Cyprus 1240 0.6 53 35 
, Romania 1240 21.1 60 823 
Jamaica 1110 2.0 54 131 
Fiji 1090 0.6 18 17 
Lebanon 1070c 3.2 40 50 
Mexico 1050 60.0 1073 1302 
Brazil 1030 107.0 1307 2055 
Total 266.6 3745 6380 
Annual average 624 1595 
As % of new commitments 30.9 30.2 
a) 1976 f{orld Bank Atlas, Annex. 
b) Totals may not add up due to rounding off. 
cJ 1974. 
B. 
Table 3: IBRD Zending to poorest countries ($ miZZioh) 
Population GNP p.c. IBRD new commitments Of which 
Country Third Window 
1975 (mlri) 1975($) 1969;;;74· 1975'-78 1976;;;77 
Least lJeveZoped 
Bangladesh 78.6 90 18 
Ethiopia 28.0 100 38 
Guinea 5.5 130 74 
Malawi 5.0 130 26 17 
Tanzania 14.7 170 115 184 42 
Uganda 11.6 250 52 
Sudan 15.6 270 5 32 32 
Botswana 0.7 350 42 51 4 
17 othersa 79.6 
Total 239.3 343 293 94 
Annual average 57 73 47 
As % of new loans 2.8 1.4 13:4 
Other Poorest 
Burma 30.2 110 
India 608.0 140 263 1018 159 
Zaire 24.7 140 100 
Sri Lanka 13.6 150 48 
Pakistan 69.2 160 215 235 60 
Madagascar 8.8 200 21 7 
Sierra Leone 3.0 200 8 7 
Kenya 13.4 220 182 364 '32 
Total 770.9 737 1731 251 
Annual average 123 433 126 
As % of new loans 6.1 8.2 35.9 
Petroleum exporters 
Indonesia 132.1 220 48 1724 
Nigeria 75.0 340 402 325 
Total 207.1 450 2049 
Annual average 75 512 
As % of new loans 3.7 9.7 
a) Rwanda, Upper Volta, Mali, Burundi, Somalia, Nepal, Chad, Afghanistan, 
Niger, Benin, Haiti, Lesotho, 'The Gambia, Yemen, A.R. Cent.ral African 
Empire, Yemen PDR, W. Samoa. 
Source: . AnnuaZReports. 
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Table 4: IBRD Zending to low inaome aountries ($ miZlion) (GNP p.a. between 
$ 250-520 in 1975) 
GNP p.c. Population IBRD new commitments of which 
Country Third Window 
1975 ($) 1975 (mln) 1969-74 1975-78 1976-:77 
Togo 250 2.2 60 
Egypt 260 37.2 675 62 
Cameroon 290 7.3 83 118 24 
Mauritania 320 1.3 
Eq. Guinea 320 0.3 
Thailand 350 41.9 347 534 26 
Bolivia 360 5.6 23 226 10 
Honduras 360 2.9 46 96 12 
Senegal 360 5.0 23 63 21 
Philippines 380 42.2 291 1204 35 
Liberia 410 1.5 23 82 4 
Swaziland 440 0.5 24 
El Salvador 460 4.0 59 80 9 
Papua New Guinea 470 2.8 49 16 
Morocco 470 16.7 375 450 25 
Jordan 480 2.7 
Congo P.R. 510 1.3 46 
Total 175.4 1319 3674 228 
Annual average 220 919 114 
As % of new loans 10.9 17.4 32.6 
Table 5: Distribution of IDA' al'edits by aow~try and inaome alasses, 1961-78 
No~~of-"" -"----"---"----- - --"--"-"---"- -~----- -"""--"--
coun- Type of Countries 1961 1969 1975 1961 tries 
-68 -74 -78 -68 
25 Least Developed 382.5 1041.9 1516.5 20.9 
10 Other Poorest' 1079;0 3021,5 2515.2 58.9 
21 Intermediate ($266-
520 p.c.) 139.6 594.0 476.0 7.6 
14 Marginal (above $520 
p.c.) 230.7 369.6 31.3 12,6 
70 Total 1831. 8 5027.0 4539.0 100.0 
Source: IDA, 1978, and 1978 Annual. Report. 
Table 6: AgriauZtu:re & RUX'al._ Devel.opment Lending, FY 1969-78 
flicml. Devel.opment* 
No. of projects 
Loan amounts ($ mIn) 
Dther agriaul.tu:re 
No. of projects 
Loan amounts ($ mIn) 
Total for AgriauZtu:re and Rural. Development 
No. of projects 
Loan amoun~s ($ mIn) 
As .a % of World Bank Totals 
- ,- . 
No. of projects 


























* projects for which it is antiCipated that 50% or more of direct benefits 
, will accrue to the rural poor. 
Source: world Bank, RORSU, October 1978. 
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